state global relationship for the foreseeable future. The relationship between the two nations during the 20 th century was marked by significant periods of conflict and crisis.
The economic and security implications of how well America, as the world's lone superpower, interacts with this quickly emerging rival are significant and could serve to shape the 21 st century global strategic environment. This work examines the strategic cultures and behaviors of the China and the United States. It reviews how ignorance of strategic culture resulted in the recent history of conflict between the two nations, and offers some broad recommendations for how U.S. policymakers might best leverage a basic understanding of the respective strategic cultures when crafting future Sino-U.S.
policy and strategy.
RELUCTANT BULLIES: CHINESE AND AMERICAN STRATEGIC CULTURE
The ancient Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu famously notes that the requirement for any military practitioner seeking battlefield success is to "know" both himself and the enemy. Although Sun Tzu likely intended this advice primarily for military leaders, it seems plausible that its value extends to the grand strategic thought of state leadership. The operative word in this maxim is "know". Knowing is an especially critical skill when national leadership considers the most important decision, when and how to initiate war. The decision to use force to achieve national objectives carries with it the potentially high cost in lives, resources, and the very existence of the state. The ability of one culture to really know another, regardless of homogeneity, is at best limited. The challenge is to understand and subsequently determine how the dominant cultural identity and beliefs of a state or group influence its leadership's decisions and behavior regarding the use of force. This is often referred to as strategic culture. 1 The intent of this work is threefold. First, to argue that strategic culture of states and groups does exist and influences strategic behavior. Second, to examine the strategic cultures and behaviors of the Peoples' Republic of China (referred to henceforth as China) and the United States and observe the recent history of conflict between the two. Finally, to offer broad recommendations for how U.S. policymakers might best leverage a basic understanding of the respective strategic cultures when crafting Sino-US policy and strategy.
What is strategic culture? Theorists have offered many definitions most slightly nuanced in their approach. For instance, Andrew Scobell defines it as "the fundamental and enduring assumptions about the role of war (both interstate and intrastate) in human affairs and the efficacy of applying force held by political and military elites in a country." 2 Scobell notes the importance of strategic cultural images, or what one state believes about another state's strategic culture, as a significant influence on behavior. 3 Alastair Johnston offers that strategic culture possesses two basic elements. The first a "central paradigm" that answers questions related to the general nature of conflict in human affairs, the nature of the adversary, and the efficacy of violence. 4 The second element is derived from how state elites and decision makers interpret that paradigm and is represented by a dominant set of national strategic preferences regarding the use of force. 5 While Scobell and Johnston have focused the majority of their efforts regarding strategic culture on the study of China, Brice Harris has addressed his definition in the context of his work on U.S. strategic culture. He notes that strategic culture captures a state's cognitive (thoughts resulting from shared values, traditions, and experiences), behavioral (social habits and traditions), and communicative (symbols, codes, languages) aspects of force and violence to achieve certain ends. 6 Another U.S. strategic cultural examiner, F.G.Hoffman, further defines it as the confluence of the established and distinct sub-cultural political, social, and military viewpoints existing within a state. Although all of these definitions take slightly different approaches to strategic culture, it's notable that their similarities far outnumber their differences. For the purpose of this examination, we will align most closely with Chinese philosophers and scholars of the time stressed the punishment of the immoral or preservation of ethical codes as the preeminent justification for war and regularly condemned material pursuits as illegitimate war aims. 19 Mencius, Confucius' most famous student, noted that the overthrow of tyranny was the aim of a justifiable war. 20 Any Chinese strategic cultural proclivity to avoid offensive use of force is certainly tempered by the acknowledgement of force as a viable tool for an economic and military power to achieve ends. Johnston indicates that this has held true even in Ancient China.
His examination of the Ming Dynasty reveals that some ancient Chinese strategists pragmatically concluded that force was often the best way to eliminate threats provided enough force was available to ensure success. If not, they recommended negotiation and the employment of other non-coercive means until they could assemble enough military capability for the successful use of force. 21 The Chinese monarchy that endured from 221 B.C. to A.D. 1911 came into being only through the application of brutal force by the First Emperor of the Qin dynasty to bring about unification. This arguably initiated a very long tradition of Chinese leaders choosing force to maintain internal and external order. 22 The resultant frequent infighting eventually weakened the monarchy and created the conditions for foreign interference.
China's use of force as a primary security tool has persisted. A study of Chinese foreign policy crises from 1929-1979 suggests that contemporary Chinese strategic culture is predisposed to use force over more peaceful conflict resolution options.
China experienced 13 crises during that period and resorted to the use of force in 10 of those cases. Additionally, China employed relatively high intensity violence (from serious clash to full scale war) in nine of those cases. 23 Since the rise to power of the Communist party in China, Chinese strategic behavior has become increasingly more pragmatic. Suisheng Zhao notes that although Chinese behavior under Mao Zedong was influenced by communist ideology, China's foreign policy and behavior since the shift to economic modernization that began in the late 1970s are driven more and more by pragmatism and realism. 24 The Chinese shift towards realism was further accelerated by the stunning U.S. What does this mean in the contemporary strategic environment? James
Townsend asserts that three broad themes have emerged in the "kaifang" or opening of
China since the reforms initiated in earnest by Deng Xiaoping during the late 1970s:
interdependence, sovereignty, and nationalism. 35 As mentioned earlier, both Scobell and Johnston assert that modern China possesses a dualistic strategic culture featuring both a pacifistic defensive identity rooted in ancient culture as well as a Realpolitik identity that understands the utility of force to achieve national interests in the contemporary operating environment. These previously discussed factors have
combined to form what Scobell describes as the Chinese Cult of Defense. This strategic cultural feature influences Chinese leadership to employ offensive force to achieve or secure national interests, while characterizing those actions as defensive in nature and the least preferred option. 36 In order to recover from the "Century of Humiliation and Shame", China's leadership subconsciously co-opt the legacy of Chinese defensive minded pacifism, prudence, and just war in order to use force in active defense of Chinese sovereignty. China maintains a robust capability to wage war and appears willing to demonstrate that capability in order to coerce and deter perceived adversaries.
However, China's traditional pacifist nature still serves to govern or limit China's actual application of force as evidenced by the long break in significant combat operations since 1979.
U.S. Strategic Culture
For a nation so young in the relative terms of human history, much has been written about the strategic culture of the U.S. In 1957 Samuel Huntington described the prevailing American view of war as rooted in a liberal ideology dominant in American political thinking from the nation's birth through the first half of the 20 th century. This liberalism was teamed with a fundamentally conservative U.S. Constitution that was specifically designed by its authors to disperse power across the federal government. Strategic culture has helped to shape divergent views of China and America regarding "ownership" of the South China Sea. This divergence coupled with the significant dayto-day military presence maintained by both nations contributes to a complex security environment prone to potential miscalculation and unintended conflict.
Recommendations for U.S. Policy and Strategy
In the contemporary strategic environment, both China and the U.S. have evolved into dualistic strategic cultures. One is bound in the philosophical and historical pacifist traditions of its people and the other acknowledging the efficacy of the use of force commensurate with great power status. The respective internal struggles between these natures serve to justify when and how each nation uses force. China, torn between a pacifist temperament grounded in its Confucian spiritual roots, the influence of the "century of humiliation and shame", and a newfound economic and military vitality, uses offensive force justified as defense of its territorial integrity and national sovereignty. America, torn between its liberal pacifist roots and its unrivaled global dominance, is sensitive to perceived threats to its great ideals as manifested in its position as world's most powerful nation. As a result, the U.S. also uses offensive force justified as defense of "universal" ideas.
U.S. policymakers should develop policy and strategy regarding China in the context of both nations' strategic cultures. As an emerging power, most observers agree that China will likely continue to expand its spheres of influence into the East China Sea, South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, and Indian Ocean. With this in mind, a few broad recommendations to help frame future policy might include the following. military on the human element of war. Humanizing America seeks to highlight the similarities and downplay the differences between the respective strategic cultures and forces China to collectively reconsider its strategic cultural assumptions.
The history of mutual U.S. and Chinese strategic cultural understanding is not a good one. The 20 th Century was marked by demonstrations of the strategic cultural ignorance of both nations resulting in direct armed conflict or proxy war between the two powers. As both the complexity of the contemporary strategic environment and the military power of each nation continue to grow, the potential for future conflict with catastrophic consequences is unmistakable. It is naïve to rely solely on the belief that the significant economic interdependence of both countries will preclude armed conflict.
A more comprehensive understanding of how each country approaches the decision to use force can only serve to mitigate the potential for future war between the world's top powers.
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